Ample global experience in the safe handling of used enriched uranium fuel: former IAEA advisor
Re: "Questioning the safe disposal of spent enriched uranium fuel: letter writer" (Hill Times, July 28).
Readers can rest assured that there is ample global experience in the safe handling of used enriched uranium fuel. The fact that it differs from used natural-uranium CANDU fuel bundles (which tend to be smaller and less radioactive – but produced at a much higher rate) affects the operational details, but not the ability to be safely managed.
Indeed, Finland will soon begin disposing of used enriched fuel in its geological repository, in a safe and secure process that is also fully safeguarded by the IAEA.
I certainly would not advocate abandoning our homegrown CANDU technology however: on the contrary – particularly in this era of uncertain geopolitics – Canada should fully leverage CANDU's natural advantages in resource efficiency, lack of enrichment, and domestic supply-chain.
At the same time it makes sense for Canada to utilize enriched uranium where it is well-suited: many smaller grid and off-grid applications fall within this category.
Canada might also consider embracing the burgeoning enriched uranium market, which the letter writer correctly points out is trapped in a restricted-supply / increasing-demand stranglehold. Becoming a uranium enricher nation – safely, securely, and under full IAEA safeguards – would add immense value to yet another raw product that we mostly ship out the door.
Jeremy Whitlock, PhD
Stratford, Ont.
(The writer is a nuclear consultant and former senior technical adviser at the IAEA Department of Safeguards.
Original letter to The Hill Times (2025 July 28) from F. Greening:
Questioning the safe disposal of spent enriched uranium fuel: letter writer
Re: "Remember, enriched uranium can do good: letter writer," (The Hill
Times, July 21, letter to the editor from Jeremy Whitlock). The letter writer
fails to mention at least three negative issues concerning the enrichment of
uranium
The process of uranium enrichment has resulted in the generation of well over
one million tonnes of toxic depleted uranium waste, most of which is stored as
volatile, extremely corrosive and toxic uranium hexafluoride in open air
storage yards close to enrichment plante.
Depleted uranium, in the form of high-density metallic uranium, is used by the
US, UK, Russia, China, France and Pakistan to produce depleted uranium
weapons. This use continues in spite of the fact that research has shown an
increase in birth defects near battlefields in Iraq where depleted uranium
weaponry was deployed from 2003 to 2011.
The process of uranium enrichment has resulted in the generation of well over
one million tonnes of toxic depleted uranium waste, most of which is stored as
volatile, extremely corrosive and toxic uranium hexafluoride in open air
storage yards close to enrichment plants.
Depleted uranium, in the form of high-density metallic uranium, is used by the
US, UK, Russia, China, France and Pakistan to produce depleted uranium
weapons. This use continues in spite of the fact that research has shown an
increase in birth defects near battlefields in Iraq where depleted uranium
weaponry was deployed from 2003 to 2011.
Enriched uranium fuel, which is slated for use in small modular reactors
(SMRs), is far more radioactive per irradiated fuel assembly than CANDU
fuel. This is because, SMR fuel assemblies, such as the GNF2 fuel bundle to
be used in Darlington's BWRX-300 SMR, are about 10 times larger and
heavier than CANDU fuel assemblies. This raises many questions about the
safe disposal of spent enriched uranium fuel.
If we abandon CANDU technology, we will become reliant on imported
nuclear fuel because Canada does not make enriched uranium. Does Mr.
Whitlock not realize that Russia presently controls nearly half of the world's
uranium enrichment capacity and is a major exporter of enriched uranium to
countries including China, South Korea, and France? Which would Mr.
Whitlock prefer: that we buy enriched uranium from the U.S., (undoubtedly
with high tariffs), or from Russia, who could impose sanctions at a whim?
Dr. F. R. Greening
Hamilton, ON
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